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Dodd–Frank: Toward Greater Financial System Stability
A Conversation with Robert D. Hankins
Robert D. (Bob) Hankins is an executive vice president at the Federal Reserve Bank of 
Dallas, responsible for the Eleventh District’s banking supervisory activities. In July 2010, 
Congress approved the Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act in 
response to the global financial crisis. At almost 2,000 pages, the act spells out new laws 
and regulations whose ramifications for financial institutions are broad and complex. In 
this interview, Hankins fields questions about the act and its implications.
Q. What are the major goals of the financial 
reforms as laid out in the Dodd–Frank Act?
A. The best summary of Dodd–Frank’s goals 
is found in its preamble, which states that the 
act aims to promote financial stability, end 
“too big to fail” (failing banks allowed to con-
tinue operating because they are considered 
too large to be closed), protect taxpayers by 
ending bailouts and protect consumers from 
abusive lending practices. Of course, whether 
it accomplishes these objectives has been the 
subject of a considerable debate. 
Q. Dallas Fed President Richard Fisher has 
spoken at length about the dangers of financial 
institutions that are too big to fail. How does 
Dodd–Frank address this? Are the changes likely 
to be effective?
A. Protecting the financial system and taxpay-
ers from the consequences of difficulties at 
large financial institutions was one of Dodd–
Frank’s main goals. The legislation contains 
a number of safeguards and changes to the 
supervisory apparatus intended to accomplish 
this. For instance, large, systemically important 
institutions—and not just banks, by the way—
will be subjected to enhanced prudential su-
pervision, which is to be more stringent and 
rigorous than what we do for smaller institu-
tions. 
The banking supervision function is also 
undergoing some fundamental changes. In 
addition to focusing on individual institutions, 
we are also taking a more macroprudential 
perspective that looks at threats to the stability 
of the entire financial system. Finally, Dodd–
Frank implements a new resolution regime 
that allows failing financial firms such as large 
bank holding companies or other important 
financial firms to enter into receivership to fa-
cilitate an orderly wind down of operations. 
This option wasn’t available during the crisis 
and should help deal with too big to fail.
Q. You said even nonbank firms that are 
designated as systemically important will now 
be subjected to enhanced supervision. How will 
this designation be made? Have any nonbank 
firms been identified yet?
A. The Financial Stability Oversight Council, 
composed of all major financial market regula-
tors, will determine which nonbank firms are 
systemically important. Dodd–Frank lists 10 
criteria that the council must consider. These 
include things such as size, leverage, inter-
connectedness and importance as a source of 
credit. The council issued an Advanced Notice 
of Proposed Rulemaking in October 2010 that 
sought input on developing a framework for 
making its designations. After getting public 
comment, the council issued a formal request 
for comment on its proposal of how to select 
nonbank firms for enhanced supervision. But, 
reflecting the importance and significance the 
council places on these decisions, it recently 
indicated that it will seek additional comment. 
So, no firms have yet been named. Any de-
termination requires a two-thirds vote by the 
council, including the chairman’s approval. 
Even after that, a company has the right to a 
hearing before the council, which is required 
to submit a report to Congress regarding the 
decision. The determination is also subject to 
judicial review.
Q. How are institutions going to be supervised? 
What changes, in particular, are in store for the 
Dallas Fed?
A. The Federal Reserve is now responsible for 
supervising all organizations that are deemed 
systemically important. This will include bank 
holding companies with $50 billion or more in 
assets and the nonbank financial firms that the 
Financial Stability Oversight Council decides 
are important to financial stability. The Fed will 
also be responsible for developing enhanced 
prudential standards for these institutions. 
The goal is to subject these systemically im-
portant financial institutions, or SIFIs, as they 
have come to be known, to greater oversight 
and more rigorous standards that reflect the 
heightened risks they may pose. Things such 
as capital requirements, liquidity requirements 
and overall risk-management strategies are go-
ing to be more stringent for the SIFIs. 
As far as the Dallas Fed is concerned, we 
have one institution that meets the act’s min-
imum-size requirement for enhanced supervi-
sion, Dallas-based Comerica Inc. Dodd–Frank 
also places the supervision of savings-and-loan 
holding companies under the Fed, since the 
act does away with the Office of Thrift Super-
vision. For us, that means supervision of about 
25 extra organizations, one of which, San An-
tonio’s USAA, is the largest financial institution 
based in Texas. 
Q. During the crisis, the Federal Reserve 
introduced a number of emergency measures 
to help stabilize financial markets. Does Dodd–
Frank affect the Fed’s ability to respond to 
future crises?
A. In response to events that unfolded at an 
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“Until someone invents a crystal ball that works, the best we can 
do is try to minimize the impact of the next crisis through effective, 
though not stifling, supervision and preservation of capital.”
mostly invoked Section 13(3) of the Federal 
Reserve Act, which allowed it to lend to any 
entity under “unusual and exigent circum-
stances” as long as five members of the Board 
of Governors approved. Dodd–Frank requires 
that any such aid program or facility be broad-
based and not directed at any one institution. 
Also, while the Fed consulted with the Trea-
sury before setting up the various programs, 
it wasn’t required to do so. Now, the legisla-
tion requires that the Fed gain the Treasury’s 
approval before establishing any similar pro-
grams or facilities. 
Q. Since Dodd–Frank imposes additional 
regulation and fees on the banking industry, will 
these greater costs affect banks’ ability to lend? 
Is there a difference between small and large 
banks?
A. Studies have shown that the cost and bur-
den of regulation fall disproportionately on 
smaller banks. Larger banks can more eas-
ily absorb the increased expense, and that is 
why it is important that as much as possible 
be done to minimize the impact on smaller 
banks. And, of course, the potential impact on 
lending for banks of all sizes increases with ris-
ing cost structure and staff time devoted to en-
suring compliance with laws and regulations. 
At the same time, we have seen the result of 
reckless lending practices and disregard for 
prudent risk management on credit availability 
as banks work to repair balance sheets and 
rebuild capital. So, I guess the real question 
is whether the cost of prevention—the intent 
of Dodd–Frank—is cheaper than the cure? 
I would argue for the former, but I certainly 
understand the frustration felt by those who 
played by the rules and who must now bear 
some of the burden for those who did not.
Q. What are you hearing from the Dallas Fed’s 
district banks? What are the biggest changes 
they will confront? 
A. As I participate on regulatory panels and 
with President Fisher in CEO forums around 
the district, the common theme is concern 
about the increased regulatory burden and as-
sociated cost. The Dallas district consists large-
ly of community banks. While Dodd–Frank 
was aimed primarily at enhanc-
ing the supervision of the larg-
est organizations that create the 
biggest risk to financial stability, 
community bankers are con-
cerned about the trickle-down 
effect. They are anxious that 
Dodd–Frank regulations and 
policies adopted by the super-
visory agencies will be written 
and applied as one-size-fits-all. 
The bankers I talk to are wor-
ried about how they will absorb increased 
compliance costs and remain profitable and 
viable, meeting the credit needs of their com-
munities.
To allay these concerns, the Federal Re-
serve is trying to provide more guidance to 
bankers and examiners about what applies to 
community banks and what doesn’t. Addition-
ally, the Federal Reserve’s Supervision Com-
mittee has established a subcommittee to focus 
on the effects of proposed rules on community 
banks. Each Federal Reserve district has also 
created a Community Bank Depository Institu-
tion Advisory Council. A representative from 
each of the councils meets twice a year with 
the Board of Governors to provide direct feed-
back on issues affecting community banks.
Q. If the supervisory structure and regulations 
in Dodd–Frank had been in effect during the 
recent housing boom and bust, do you think the 
financial market crisis that ensued would have 
been more limited in depth and breadth? Please 
explain. 
A. You would certainly like to think so, but you 
will never know. The real question, I think, is 
whether Dodd–Frank will prevent another cri-
sis. My response is, probably not. Responding 
to the savings-and-loan and banking crises of 
the 1980s and early ’90s, Congress passed the 
Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and 
Enforcement Act of 1989 and the Federal De-
posit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act 
of 1991 with the idea they would prevent a 
future crisis. Obviously, they did not. To quote 
my good friend Thomas Hoenig, who until 
Oct. 1 was president of the Kansas City Fed, 
“I have a crystal ball on my desk. It doesn’t 
work.”
Until someone invents a crystal ball that 
works, the best we can do is try to minimize 
the impact of the next crisis through effective, 
though not stifling, supervision and preserva-
tion of capital. Lessons have been learned and 
will be applied going forward. But by their 
nature, laws and regulations are backward-
looking, designed to prevent the cause of the 
last crisis from being the cause of the next one.
Q. So, what is your overall assessment of 
Dodd–Frank?
A. Legislation this sweeping and comprehen-
sive is bound to be controversial, and Dodd–
Frank is no exception. We’ve certainly heard 
many doubts about whether it really ends tax-
payer bailouts and too big to fail, and we’ve 
heard a number of complaints about increased 
regulatory burden. There is also concern about 
the inevitable unintended consequences. 
These are all valid. But instituting a more mac-
roprudential approach to the supervisory pro-
cess, along with a new resolution regime for 
failing firms, and extending regulatory over-
sight to important players within the financial 
system that aren’t banks are important steps 
that hopefully will result in a safer and more 
sound financial system. 